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Can the prevailing description of educational reality be considered complete? On the Parks-
Eichmann paradox, spooky action at a distance, and a missing dimension in the theory of 
education1 
Gert Biesta 
 
Introduction 
On 15 May 1935 the journal Physical Review published a paper with the title ‘Can the 
quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?,’ authored by 
Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen (Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen 1935). In the 
paper the authors argued that the prevailing interpretation of quantum mechanics – the so-
called Copenhagen interpretation – contained a paradox and could therefore not be seen as 
a complete description of physical reality. The paradox, which subsequently has become 
known as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, has to do with the fact that particles can 
interact in such a way that it is possible to measure both their position and their momentum 
more accurately than Heisenberg’s uncertain principle would allow for, unless measuring one 
particle would instantaneously affect the other. The latter, however, would require that 
information travels faster than the speed of light, and such ‘spooky action at a distance,’ as 
Einstein called it, was considered to be impossible.2 
 
The question I address in this paper is, in a sense, similar to the argument put forward by 
Einstein and his colleagues, in that I wish to explore to what extent the prevailing description 
of educational reality that can be found in contemporary research, policy and practice can be 
considered complete. The motivation for asking this question stems from an educational 
paradox to which I will refer as the Parks-Eichmann paradox. This paradox has to do with the 
fact that what appears as educational success from one perspective, is actually quite 
problematic when viewed differently, whereas what appears as educational failure may 
actually reveal something that is of crucial importance educationally. The paradox thus leads 
to the suggestion that the prevailing description of educational reality – to which I will refer 
as the ‘paradigm’ of education as cultivation – is insufficient or incomplete. 
 
I use the work of John Dewey to highlight key characteristics and key shortcomings of this 
‘paradigm’ and argue that it needs to be supplemented by what I will refer to as an existential 
educational ‘paradigm.’ I highlight the distinction between the two paradigms through the 
question whether it is possible to educate ‘directly’ – an option which Dewey explicitly denies. 
I then turn to the German notions of Bildung and Erziehung in order to explore to what extent 
they provide us with a set of concepts for articulating the distinction between the two 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Johannes Bellmann for his very helpful insights in the German discussion 
about Bildung and Erziehung; and I would like to thank Dietrich Benner for allowing me to 
read the manuscript of his latest book. 
2 In contemporary physics it is assumed that this phenomenon exists, though not as action at 
a distance. 
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educational paradigms. I will show that this is not as straightforward as it may seem, as there 
is no agreement about the exact definitions of the terms. However, having two terms rather 
than just the word ‘education’ is important in order to be able to make the distinction I am 
after, and here the terms Bildung and Erziehung are helpful. I conclude the paper with a brief 
sketch of the ‘existential work’ of education in order to outline what the existential paradigm 
implies for educational practice.3 But let me begin, then, with a paradox. 
 
The Parks-Eichmann paradox 
On 1 December 1955 in the city of Montgomery, Alabama, Rosa Parks rejected the order from 
the driver of the bus she had boarded to give up her seat in the ‘colored’ section to a white 
passenger,4 just as Claudette Colvin had done nine months earlier (for the latter see Hoose 
2010). Although Parks did comply with the message on the sign in the bus which read “white 
forward, colored rear,” she refused to obey the driver’s authority to assign seats, which 
eventually led to her arrest.5 This triggered the so-called Montgomery Bus Boycott which 
lasted from 5 December 1955 until 20 December 1956, the day on which a federal ruling was 
implemented that declared that the Alabama and Montgomery laws about passenger 
segregation on busses were unconstitutional. 
 
On 11 April 1961 a special tribunal of the Jerusalem District Court began the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann, the Nazi SS-Obersturmbahnführer who had been tasked with organising and 
managing the logistics of the mass deportation of Jews and others to ghettos and 
extermination camps in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe during World War II. After a lengthy 
process, Eichmann was convicted on 15 counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes 
against the Jewish people, and membership of a criminal organisation, although he was not 
declared guilty of personally killing anyone. On 15 December 1961 Eichmann was sentenced 
to death by hanging. The appeal against the verdict was eventually denied, as was a request 
for clemency, and Eichmann was eventually executed on 1 June 1962. What made Eichmann’s 
case famous (see, e.g., Arendt 1963) is the fact that he did admit arranging the mass 
deportation of Jews and others but denied responsibility for the consequences – their 
extermination – on the account that he was only following orders. 
 
When looked at from an educational angle, the cases of Rosa Parks and Adolf Eichmann 
present us with a paradox. If we assume, as is done in a still growing number of research 
                                                          
3 In Biesta (in press) I discuss the implications for educational research. 
4 For the details see https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-
faith/wp/2015/12/01/5-myths-about-rosa-parks-the-woman-who-had-almost-a-biblical-
quality/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.34441056eb50; last accessed 22 March 2019. 
5 Parks has been very clear about her reason for not giving up her seat. “People always say 
that I didn’t give up my seat because I was tired, but that isn’t true. I was not tired physically, 
or no more tired than I was at the end of a working day… No, the only tired I was, was tired 
of giving in.” (Parks 1992, p. 116) 
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studies and in a still increasing number of schools, colleges and universities, that education is 
an intervention that is supposed to bring about certain pre-defined effects or outcomes, and 
if it is also assumed that the more effective the link between intervention and outcome is, the 
more successful education can considered to be, then it seems as if we should declare the 
education of Adolf Eichmann a success and the education of Rosa Parks a failure. With 
Eichmann there was, after all, a perfect match between what was expected from him and his 
own actions. Eichmann had learned to listen well, so we might say.  And although Rosa Parks 
was able to effectively decode the messages that were targeted at her – her functional literacy 
was in order, as was her ability to understand laws, rules and regulations – she obviously 
didn’t act upon this understanding. 
 
The paradox, however, has to do with the fact that what appears as success (Eichmann) or 
failure (Parks) from the perspective of effective instruction and successful learning – 
education as qualification and socialisation (see Biesta 2009) – turns out to be the opposite 
when viewed from what we might term the ‘humane’ perspective, that is the perspective of 
existing-as-subject – education as subjectification (see ibid.). This then raises the question of 
the exact ‘status’ of the latter perspective and how it relates to the former. For an answer to 
this question I turn to an interesting argument in the work of the German educational scholar 
Dietrich Benner. 
 
Does education make a difference? 
In a fascinating passage in his book Allgemeine Pädagogik (Benner 2015), Benner asks 
whether education matters, that is, whether the work of parents, teachers and other 
educators makes a difference to the one being educated. He approaches this question in the 
context of the nature-nurture debate, and asks what the relative contribution of nature, 
nurture and education to the formation of human beings might be. This seems to be an 
important question for educators, because if it turns out that our genetic make-up (nature) 
would account for, say, 75%, and the influence from the environment (nurture) for, say, 20%, 
then there is very little scope left for education to make a difference. This issue is particularly 
important in our time, partly because there are studies that suggest that the contribution of 
our genetic-make up is even higher than 75% (see, e.g., Harris 2009), and partly because many 
parents and teachers really struggle to limit the influences from the outside world on their 
children and students, for example in relation to what enters the home and the school 
through social media. 
 
While one might expect that Benner, as an eminent professor of education, would try to make 
the case for a rather large contribution of education vis-à-vis the influences from nature and 
nurture, he comes with the remarkable suggestion that irrespective of what percentage one 
would claim for nature on the one hand and nurture on the other, together these always add 
up to 100% (see Benner 2015, p. 73). Rather than reading this as an argument for giving up 
on education altogether, Benner pursues a different line by arguing that the educational 
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question6 – and hence the orientation of the educational work of parents and teachers – is 
actually of an entirely different order.  An order that is not ‘bio-neuro-socio-cultural,’ to use 
my own words, but thoroughly existential. 
 
Education, so Benner suggests, is not about the ways individuals are shaped from the inside-
out, so to speak, that is as a result of the development of their genetic make-up and biological 
constitution, nor is it about how individuals are shaped from the outside-in, so to speak, that 
is, as a result of influences from the environment. This is not because these processes do not 
happen, but because education is interested in an altogether different question, namely the 
question how human beings, as individuals, exist, that is, how they try to lead their own life, 
make choices, say ‘yes’ to some opportunities and ‘no’ to others, get out of bed in the morning 
or have a lie in, fall in love, are faced with illness, grow old, feel joy and guilt, and so on. 
 
If the question of nature and nurture is about the way in which the human organism develops 
and grows, both as a result of ‘internal’ biological processes and influences from the outside, 
the educational question, to put it briefly but accurately, is about how an ‘I’ can step forward 
from all this. And here we can find the educational reading of the Parks-Eichmann paradox, 
because whereas Rosa Parks did step forward as an ‘I’ – an ‘I’ who asserted that she did no 
longer wanted to be part of the particular societal order she found herself in – Adolf 
Eichmann, when asked, said that his ‘I’ was actually not involved, other, that is, than in 
following orders. He was, in other words, willing to submit his ‘I’ to the societal order. 
Whereas Rosa Parks’s ‘I’ stepped forward, so to speak, Eichmann withdrew his ‘I.’  
 
Viewed in this way – and this is the point Benner is after – we can say that the educational 
question is not the question of who we are and how we (have) become who we are – which 
is the question of identity. The educational question rather is the question of how we are, 
how we exist, how we try to lead our own life, what we will do with who we have become, 
with what we have learned, with the skills we have acquired, with the competencies we have 
developed, but also with our incompetence, our blind spots, the things we are not able to do, 
and so on. Rather than identity, this is the question of what we might refer to as our ‘subject-
ness,’7 our way of and our attempts at existing-as-subject of our own life, not as object of 
influences from ‘elsewhere’ (see also Gössling 1993). 
 
With the help of Benner, I have made a rather strong claim about what education is, arguing 
that education is concerned with the question of the ‘I’ and, more importantly, with the 
question how the ‘I’ exists as ‘I.’ I wish to emphasise that the point I am trying to make is not 
                                                          
6 Where I use ‘education’ in this context, Benner uses the word ‘Erziehung.’ I will explain 
below why and how this matters. 
7 I prefer the rather awkward term ‘subject-ness’ over the word ‘subjectivity,’ as the latter 
runs the risk of being read as an epistemological category, not an existential one, and it is the 
existential ‘perspective’ that I am after here. 
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semantic – it is not about the definition of the word ‘education’ – but is about identifying a 
dimension of educational reality that runs the risk of disappearing from sight if we only think 
of education in terms of effective instruction and successful learning. How we ‘name’ this 
dimension is important as well, and in relation to this question there is a problem with the 
fact that the English language only seems to have one word – education – to speak about the 
reality of education, so to speak. This is why, below, I will have a look at the two concepts, 
Bildung and Erziehung, that play a central role in the vocabulary of German educational 
scholarship. Before I do so, I would like to say more about the two ‘dimensions’ of educational 
reality that I seek to bring into view in this paper suggesting that, in addition to a ‘paradigm’ 
that sees education as cultivation, there is also the need for what I will refer to as an 
existential ‘paradigm’ of education. 
 
Paradigm 1: Education as cultivation 
The paradigm of education as cultivation is interested in the way in which human beings 
become who they are as a result of the interplay of ‘internal’ factors and ‘external’ influences. 
It focuses, in other words, on the way in which human beings become and continue to become 
who they are through their engagement with ‘culture’ in the broadest sense of the word. The 
paradigm of cultivation partly provides an explanation of how individuals become who they 
are as a result of these processes – it, explains, for example how individuals become speakers 
of a particular language or adopters of particular attitudes and values. But the paradigm of 
cultivation is also an educational programme, that is, a way of organising education. 
According to this paradigm, the task of education is making sure that individuals can engage 
with the widest possible range of culture – or cultural ‘tools’ – in order to allow them to 
develop the largest number of capacities and possibilities in the fullest way possible. 
 
There are many contemporary examples of the paradigm of cultivation – for example 
educational practices that seek to provide children and young people with cultural and social 
capital; educational practices that seek to make room for the many languages of children, 
their natural curiosity, their innate capacities, etcetera; or educational practices that focus 
strongly on providing opportunities for children and young people to flourish in the widest 
sense possible. I wish to suggest that a ‘paradigm case’ of this way of understanding and 
‘doing’ education can be found in the work of John Dewey (1859-1952).8 Dewey does see 
education basically as a process of cultivation as can be seen, for example, in his contention 
that “(t) he ultimate problem of all education is to co-ordinate the psychological and the social 
factors" (Dewey, 1895, p. 224), that is, how individual development can ‘connect’ with social 
and cultural resources. It is also indicative that out of this, human individuals emerge as what 
                                                          
8 I have discussed Dewey’s work extensively in a number of publications (see, for example, 
Biesta 1995; 2006; 2014; Biesta & Burbules 2003). My point in discussing Dewey here is not 
to engage in a discussion about his work as such, but to present him as a powerful and rather 
‘precise’ example of the idea of education as a process of cultivation. 
manuscript – July 2019  
6 
 
Dewey refers to as ‘acculturated organisms’ (Dewey 1988, p.15); organisms who have 
‘acquired’ culture and through this have become ‘encultured.’ 
 
It is interesting to see that Dewey explicitly rejects the idea that educators should determine 
the aims of education, suggesting that this puts external and, in a sense, artificial limits on the 
ways in which children become. Instead, therefore, Dewey argues that education should focus 
on growth and should be understood as growth. His argument for this is that “since growth is 
the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself” (Dewey 
1985, p.58). When one reads his views on democracy from this angle it can be argued that 
the first and perhaps main reason why Dewey is interested in a democratic society as a society 
with varied interests and free interplay (see ibid., p.89) is because such a society provides the 
optimal conditions for the growth of all individuals (for such a reading see Biesta 2016). It is, 
in other words, the optimal situation for cultivation. 
 
Can we educate directly? 
One interesting implication of the paradigm of cultivation that can be found in Dewey’s work 
has to do with his claim that it is impossible to educate directly, but that we can only educate 
“indirectly, by means of the environment” (Dewey 1985, p.23). The reason Dewey makes this 
claim stems from the fact that he conceives of human beings as living organisms who are in 
constant ‘transaction’ (Dewey’s term) with their environment. This is a process of constant 
‘doing and undergoing’ – Dewey compares it with breathing, for example – in which the 
organism seeks to maintain an interactive balance with its environment. In this process both 
the organism and the environment change over time; the environment changes as a result of 
the actions of the organism, but the organism changes in order to adapt to the (changing) 
environment. Dewey refers to these changes as habits, which are not actions in themselves 
but ‘predispositions to act.’ While much of this goes on naturally, so we might say – in most 
cases we manage to adapt quickly and easily – Dewey particularly focuses on those situations 
in which the organism encounters a situation that calls out conflicting habits. In everyday 
language we might say that in those situations the organism is not sure what to do, which 
also means that for the organism it’s actually not clear what kind of environment it is 
encountering. 
 
Dewey argues that one way to resolve this predicament is through trial-and-error. This is how 
we often are able to restore a smooth transaction, but the problem with trial-and-error is, of 
course, that we can also err, and some errors can be lethal. It is therefore important, from 
the perspective of the survival of the organism, to get it ‘right.’ This is where human organisms 
have an advantage, because they can come in the possession of symbols which allow them to 
‘act without acting,’ as Dewey puts it, that is, first trying out different ways of responding 
symbolically, in imagination or thought, and then, once one has identified the most plausible 
or least risky way forward, to act in that way. Of course, there is still a risk that the transaction 
is not restored – the proof of the pudding remains in the eating – but at least the action has 
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become more ‘intelligent,’ as Dewey calls it, and less dependent on ‘blind’ trial-and-error. 
Symbols are not innate, according to Dewey, but emerge from social interaction, that is, from 
the ways in which human organisms try to co-ordinate their interaction. Dewey refers to such 
co-ordination as communication, which he defines behaviourally, as “making something in 
common in at least two different centres of behaviour” (Dewey 1958, p.178). 
 
Dewey thus provides a very detailed account of the way in which human organisms become 
cultivated, so to speak, showing that this is an interactive process of organism and 
environment, not just development from within or only influences from the outside. On the 
one hand Dewey’s theory can be understood as a theory of reflective or intelligent problem 
solving aimed at restoring the transaction of organism and environment, including the 
transaction of organisms with other organisms. At the same time Dewey provides us with a 
theory of (reflective) learning. Such learning first of all takes place at the level of the body, so 
to speak, through the way in which organisms constantly acquire new habits, new patterns of 
action that are functional for the environments they are in interaction with. Yet when the 
human organism makes use of symbols in the process of problem solving, there is also an 
outcome at the level of symbols: knowledge, learning and understanding. And the reason why 
Dewey holds that we can never educate directly but only by means of the environment, is 
because, according to Dewey’s theory, the only way in which we can promote the acquisition 
of new habits and knowledge is by putting the human organism in new environments, as it is 
through interaction with such environments that human organisms acquire new habits and 
knowledge and hence learn. 
 
What is missing in this picture? 
Dewey thus provides a rather interesting theory of how human organisms become 
enculturated. What is particularly attractive about Dewey’s approach is that he doesn’t see 
this as a purely ‘mental’ or ‘cognitive’ process, but as something that is fully embodied, so to 
speak. What is also attractive about Dewey’s approach is that he doesn’t see it is a purely 
individual process but as a social or, to be more precise, intersubjective process, in which 
communication understood as the coordination of the actions of at least two organisms, plays 
a central role. For these reasons Dewey’s theory has, over the years, become quite popular 
and is still increasing in popularity.9 But although the theory looks quite complete and 
comprehensive, there is something missing. Dewey’s theory – which I have presented as a 
‘paradigm case’ of the paradigm of cultivation – is a theory of intelligent adjustment to always 
evolving environing conditions. It is, in other words, a theory of intelligent survival. The 
problem I wish to highlight here, however, is that survival is not the same as life, to put it 
                                                          
9 One reason why this may be the  case is that Dewey’s ideas seem to fit rather well with the 
nowadays often repeated idea that the world is changing so rapidly that we do no longer 
know what the future will look like, and hence the best thing to do in education is equip 
students with the skills for intelligent adaptation, so to speak. Elsewhere (Biesta 2015) I have 
tried to make clear what the problem which such an adaptive ‘agenda’ for education is.  
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briefly. Survival is not the same as human existence or it is at least not the only ‘modality’ of 
human existence. 
 
While Dewey thus gives a sophisticated and detailed account of the ways in which human 
beings can adjust reflectively and intelligently to the situations they find themselves in, the 
thing that is remarkable absent in Dewey’s account is the possibility for the human organism 
to refuse such adaptation and adjustment. What is remarkably absent in Dewey’s theory, so 
we might say, is the possibility for the human organism to say no – and in the two vignettes 
with which I have opened this paper I have tried to make clear how important this is for our 
existence as human beings. We could say, therefore, that Dewey provides us with a theory of 
learning – and there is no doubt that Rosa Parks and Adolf Eichmann both learned – but not 
with a theory of education in the way in which I have presented this above, that is, as a theory 
that seeks to foreground the question of the ‘I’ – the ‘I’ who stands for the task of leading his 
or her own life, rather than just the task of securing smooth transactions with its environment. 
It is the ‘I’ who will sometimes say ‘yes,’ but in other situations will say ‘no’ and will have to 
say ‘no.’ The paradigm of cultivation is thus able to ‘explain’ Eichmann, but not Parks. This is 
perhaps the main blind spot, the main thing that is missing, in the paradigm of cultivation. It 
thus suggests the need for an altogether different educational paradigm: the paradigm of 
existence. 
 
Paradigm 2: Existential education 
 
 
In the line of thought presented so far, I have already indicated a number of times what the 
central focus of this different educational paradigm is. Very briefly we might say that this 
paradigm is the paradigm of the ‘I,’ where the ‘I’ is not an organism that becomes cultivated 
but a human individual who exists and stands for the challenge to lead his or her own life. 
That is why this paradigm can be characterised as an existential paradigm. One of the 
interesting things about this paradigm – which reveals that it is fundamentally different from 
the paradigm of cultivation – is that the ‘I’ is not the outcome of a process of cultivation and 
therefore not something that can be produced educationally. The ‘I,’ as Winfried Böhm puts 
it, is fundamentally the ‘work of the self’ (see Böhm 1997, p.199). The ‘I’ has to be its own ‘I,’ 
so to speak, and no one can do this for the ‘I.’ 
 
This doesn’t mean, however, that education has nothing to do here, but the educational work 
is not a matter of trying to influence or support the development of the human organism, but 
rather has to do with encouraging the self to be a self; encouraging the self not to walk away 
from itself, so to speak. Dietrich Benner, using a phrase from Johann Gottlieb Fichte, calls this 
‘Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit,’ which we could translate as ‘summoning to self-action’ 
(see Benner 2015; see also Langewand 2003; Benner 2003). It is important to see, however, 
that this summoning is not the injunction to be yourself – which would quickly turn everything 
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back to the question of identity – and even less so the summoning just to become active. It 
rather is the injunction to be a self, to be an ‘I.’ In very simple terms that go to the heart of 
the matter, this summoning happens when we say “Hey, you there! Where are you?” – and I 
have shown that when Eichmann encountered this question he almost literally said “I am not 
here,” “It wasn’t me,” “I was only following orders”.10  
 
This injunction, this “Hey, you there, where are you?,” is a very direct question. It is, in other 
words, an example, and perhaps even the prime example, of direct education that goes from 
‘soul’ to ‘soul,’ so to speak (on this terminology see Biesta 2017a) rather than that it is a 
matter of organisms trying to adjust their actions to each other to secure ongoing successful 
transaction. If, from the paradigm of cultivation, such direction education is the kind of action 
at a distance that is considered impossible and hence can only appear as ‘spooky,’ in the 
existential paradigm of education such direct education, such spooky action at a distance 
actually goes to the heart of the matter, perhaps first of all literally. 
 
Finding a language: Bildung, Erziehung, and the importance of a distinction 
By outlining two different educational paradigms I have tried to make a distinction and, as I 
have tried to make clear so far, it is the distinction that matters for the theory and practice of 
education. The distinction is not my invention but can be found in the educational literature, 
albeit that not everyone makes the distinction, is sufficiently aware of it or – and this is 
particularly important – has words for making the distinction. It is here that there is a 
particular difficulty with the English language, which only has the one word ‘education,’ and 
something potentially interesting in the German language, where there are (at least) two 
words to refer to the reality of education, one being Bildung and the other being Erziehung. 
Whereas in recent years the idea of Bildung has become more visible in the English-speaking 
world (see, for example, Løvlie & Standish 2002; Biesta 2002; Pinar 2011; Horlacher 2017), 
the word Erziehung has remained remarkably invisible (for a recent exception see Guilherme 
2019; see also Biesta 2011). It can be argued, however, that together they are the 
foundational concepts of German educational thought (see, for example, Benner 2015). This 
raised the question whether these two terms and, more importantly, the distinction that they 
articulate, has something to do with the two educational paradigms I have outlined above: 
the paradigm of education as cultivation and the existential educational paradigm. 
 
The honest answer to this question has to be that it depends and, more specifically, that it 
depends on who you ask. As Benner (in press, p.46) makes clear, one of the difficulties with 
these terms is that even in the German context there is no agreed upon definition of the two 
terms and amongst German scholars there are quite different views and preferences. Some, 
such as for example Peter Petersen, see Erziehung as a rather restrictive term that refers to 
                                                          
10 It is, of course, interesting, that Eichmann still had to use the word ‘I’ in order to withdraw 
his ‘I’ from the situation. In this regard we can say that the question of the ‘I’ is not that easy 
to escape. 
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ways in which educators try to teel children what to do and how to think – close, even, to 
indoctrination – whereas Bildung is seen as a rather open process of development and 
(self)cultivation. Benner also refers to the views of Heinz-Joachim Heydorn, who saw 
Erziehung as reproduction of the existing social order and Bildung as orientated towards 
emancipation (see ibid., pp.46-47). Benner himself provides a rather different reading of the 
two terms and the distinction that can be made with them (see particularly Benner in press, 
pp. 46-50).  
 
Going back to Plato, Benner connects Bildung to the human ability to direct one’s own gaze, 
that is, to focus one’s attention on some aspect of the world. Erziehung, then, is the art of 
directing the gaze of another human being. Bildung, in this approach, thus has to do with our 
own ability to engage with the world outside of us and, to put it carefully, learn from this 
engagement, whereas Erziehung has to do with the ways in which educators can encourage 
children and young people to do so, that is, encouraging them to engage in their ‘own’ 
Bildung. This makes Bildung into a lifelong process that never finishes, and Erziehung into a 
process that ends at some point, namely when the child or young person no longer needs the 
encouragement from the outside, so to speak. 
 
Benner’s way of making the distinction thus gets closer to how I have outlined the two 
educational paradigms, although it seems as if in this particular reading the work of Erziehung 
is not so much the summoning to self-action in a general sense – the summoning to be an ‘I,’ 
as I have called it – as it is the summoning to engage in one’s own Bildung, which for Benner 
is mainly understood as the summoning to engage in one’s own learning (see ibid.). This is 
not entirely satisfactory, so I wish to suggest, because one could argue that both Parks and 
Eichmann did learn, but that the way in which their ‘I’ was ‘connected’ to or ‘involved’ in their 
learning turned out to be very different. To summon someone to be a learner is therefore not 
enough, and potentially even problematic from the educational point of view I am trying to 
articulate in this paper (see also Biesta 2013). 
 
An author who focuses more explicitly on the question of existence – rather than reducing 
existence to learning – is Winfred Böhm who, in his ‘Pädagogik der Person’ (educational 
theory of the person) characterises Bildung as the work of the self at being a self, which would 
then allow for Erziehung to be the ‘support’ of and perhaps encouragement for this work (see 
Böhm 1997, p. 201). Böhm’s work is particularly helpful because of his existential reading of 
the notion of ‘person,’ which is not the same as individual (and even less so: organism) but 
refers to the way in which the individual exists (see Böhm 2016). In my own work (see 
particularly Biesta 2017b) I have suggested that education – which, in German I would 
describe with the word Erziehung – is about arousing the desire in another human being for 
wanting to exist in the world in a grown-up way, not purely driven by one’s own desires but 
always asking whether what one desires or encounters in oneself as a desire is what one 
should desire, in light of living one’s life well, with others, on a planet with limited capacity 
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for fulfilling all our desires (see Biesta 2017b, chapter 1). This question is a radical first-person 
question: it is a question that ultimately each of us has to engage with for ourselves and where 
we should be mindful not to try to determine for others how they should answer this 
question, although we can encourage them not to forget the question. 
 
Conclusion: The existential work of education 
In this paper I have asked whether the prevailing description of educational reality – one that 
focuses on education in terms of effective instruction and successful learning, to put it briefly 
– can be considered complete, or whether there may be something missing. With the help of 
the Parks-Eichmann paradox I have tried to show that what appears as success/failure from 
the perspective of effective instruction and successful learning, turns into its opposite when 
looked at from what, perhaps a little clumsily, I have referred to as the perspective of the ‘I.’ 
We might say that whereas Rosa Parks inserted her ‘I’ in between what she had learned and 
her actions, Adolf Eichmann withdrew his ‘I’ and thus coincided with the societal order.  
 
Through a number of steps, I have tried to argue for the importance of the latter perspective, 
the perspective of the ‘I,’ and have tried to argue that this perspective is absent when we 
think of education as cultivation – which I have taken as a general ‘paradigm’ in which notions 
of effective instruction and successful learning have their place. While cultivation does help 
human beings to acquire ‘culture’ in the broadest sense of the world, and while education 
can be said to have an important role to play in making this acquisition possible, I have tried 
to show that we need a different ‘angle,’ a different paradigm, to account for the question of 
the ‘I.’  
 
Rather than seeing the ‘I’ as the outcome of the cultivation of human organisms, I have 
suggested, with Benner, that the question of the ‘I’ is of a different order: an existential rather 
than a bio-neuro-socio-cultural order. The ‘I,’ so we might say, breaks through this order and 
hence the educational work here is not that of cultivation – which will ‘only’ lead to identity 
– but of ‘Aufforderung,’ of ‘summoning,’ of calling.’ It is the simple but crucial gesture of the 
“Hey, you there! Where are you?,” which manifests itself as spooky action at a distance rather 
than an intervention in the acculturation of the organism. And no one can respond to this call 
but me, which means that it is this call that subjectivises, puts the subject-ness of the one 
being called ‘at stake’ (although the ‘I’ may still decide to walk away or keep silent). 
 
This implies that the existential work of education is first and foremost interruptive (see Biesta 
2006). It interrupts the being-with-oneself, it interrupts identity, it interrupts flourishing, it 
interrupts growth, it even interrupts learning. Such interruptions are not meant to destroy 
the self, to deny identity, to stop flourishing, to hinder growth and learning. They are meant 
to call the I who is trying to be, who is trying to be someone, who is trying to flourish, grow 
and learn into the world, so we might say; they are meant to call the ‘I’ into existence, bearing 
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in mind that it is entirely up to the ‘I’ to decide how to respond to the call. The work of the ‘I,’ 
after all, is ultimately and radically the work of the ‘I,’ that no one else can do for the ‘I.’ 
 
I have argued that one of the problems with the English language is that it only has one word 
to refer to the reality of education, namely the word ‘education,’ and that this makes it 
difficult to keep the awareness of the need for two educational ‘paradigms’ into view. In this 
regard, as I have shown, the German tradition is in a better place since it has two key concepts 
to articulate the reality of education, Bildung and Erziehung. As is so often the case, the words 
themselves cannot do the ‘work’ for us, as there are differing interpretations of both words 
available in the literature. But the two words do act as a reminder that the reality of education 
is ‘split,’ or, put differently, that it consists of two different ‘orders’ – a bio-neuro-socio-
cultural order and an existential order. It is this difference that matters. 
 
This brings me to a final observation. I have developed my argument in this paper from the 
assumption I ‘found’ in the Parks-Eichmann paradox which claims that Rosa Parks stepped 
forward as an ‘I’ whereas Adolf Eichmann withdrew his ‘I.’ I do think that stating the paradox 
in this way helped to bring the missing dimension of the paradigm of education as cultivation 
into view, as it highlighted that what counts as success in terms of that paradigm, actually 
flies in the face of what we would generally see as successful and as problematic when looking 
at the cases of Parks and Eichmann. However, one could argue that it was not so much that 
Parks’s ‘I’ was present and Eichmann’s ‘I’ was absent, but Eichmann – or perhaps Eichmann’s 
‘I’ – was as present as the ‘I’ of Rosa Parks, but simply made a different choice. 
 
Could it be, then, that we have perhaps been blinded by the fact that many (but not all) would 
consider what Rosa Parks did as morally right and many (but not all) would consider what 
Adolf Eichmann did morally wrong? Does that mean that at this more fundamental level there 
is actually no paradox at all? Or, more precisely, that the difference between Parks and 
Eichmann has nothing to do with the alleged presence or absence of their ‘I’ but with the 
moral choice they made in the situation? On that reading, which is not impossible, we would 
quickly end up with moral education, that is, with the attempt at making sure that children 
and young people acquire the right knowledge, skills and disposition and, moreover, the right 
moral frameworks and virtues so that the likelihood that they will choose right over wrong 
increases. On that reading, then, we would very quickly be back to what, in terms of this 
paper, we can characterise as moral cultivation, which is ultimately aimed at ‘containing’ the 
risk that children and young people may make wrong decisions. 
 
If moral cultivation makes children and young people into objects of moral education, the line 
I have tried to pursue in this paper is interested in the question how children and young 
people may be ‘called,’ summoned, encouraged to become subjects of moral action. For the 
latter even to become possible, their ‘I’ needs to come into play, and it is this that is at stake 
in the existential paradigm of education. Without an ‘I,’ there is after all no possibility for 
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moral action and judgement to begin with. From this angle we can see that Eichmann did 
withdraw his ‘I,’ was happy to be object rather than subject, so that the whole question of his 
responsibility would never arise or would never ‘meet’ him. Parks, on the other hand, did 
bring her ‘I’ into play, knowing perfectly well that she would be arrested as a result of doing 
so, and entirely willing to  take on the consequences of her actions. 
 
Existential education is therefore not a form of moral education and definitely not a form of 
moralising education, but education that seeks to bring the ‘I’ of the student into play, so to 
speak, and keep the ‘I’ of the student into play. Jacques Rancière captures this dynamic in a 
very interesting way when he describes the ‘call’ of the ‘emancipatory teacher’ as one which 
“forbids the supposed ignorant one the satisfaction … of admitting that one is incapable of 
knowing more” (Rancière 2006, p.6). Refusing students the satisfaction of being an object, of 
objectifying themselves, of not having to be ‘there’ as an ‘I’ is perhaps indeed the moment 
where existential education takes off. 
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